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Defendants Facing Punitive Damages Awards Are
Entitled to Protection Under the Due Process
Clause: State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Company v. Campbell
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT - DUE
PROCESS - PUNITIVE DAMAGES AWARDS - The Supreme Court
of the United States held that a punitive damages award of $145
million was excessive in violation of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Campbell,
123 S. Ct. 1513 (2003).
On May 22, 1981, Curtis Campbell (hereinafter "Campbell") was
driving with his wife, Inez Preece Campbell, along a two-lane
highway in Utah when a decision by Mr. Campbell to pass several
vehicles in his lane led to over twenty years of legal disputes.' As
Campbell pulled into the oncoming lane, Todd Ospital, who was
driving in the opposite direction, had to swerve onto the shoulder
where he lost control of his car and crashed into a van driven by
Robert Slusher (hereinafter "Slusher").2 The Campbells were un-
injured, but Mr. Ospital died in the crash and Slusher was se-
verely hurt.3 There was some dispute early in the investigation as
to who was at fault, but witnesses and investigators agreed that
Mr. Campbell was to blame for his unsafe attempt to pass.4
In September 1981, Slusher sued Campbell as well as Ospital's
estate (hereinafter "Ospital") to recover for the injuries he suffered
in the crash.' In response, Ospital filed a wrongful death cross-
claim against Campbell.6 Notwithstanding the findings of the pre-
liminary investigation pointing to Campbell's fault, his insurance
provider, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company
(hereinafter "State Farm"), refused to settle the claims and chose
1. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 123 S. Ct. 1513, 1517 (2003).
2. Campbell, 123 S. Ct. at 1517.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 65 P.3d 1134, 1141 (Utah 2001).
6. State Farm, 65 P.3d at 1141.
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to take the case to trial.' Prior to the trial, Slusher entered into a
settlement agreement with Ospital's estate, where Slusher ac-
cepted $65,000 from Ospital's liability insurance in exchange for
Ospital's assistance in the case against the Campbells.!
At trial, the jury found Campbell to be entirely at fault and
awarded a judgment of $184,849, which significantly exceeded the
pretrial offer to settle made by Slusher and Ospital, who only
sought the policy limit of $50,000. 9 Despite prior assurances made
by State Farm to Campbell that he would not be financially re-
sponsible in the event the jury found him liable for the accident,
after the verdict was rendered, State Farm made it clear that it
would only cover the policy limit and expected Campbell to pay the
remainder of the judgment. ° The Campbells hired their own
counsel to represent them in the appeal of this verdict, but as the
appeal was pending in late 1984, the Campbells entered into dis-
cussions with Slusher and Ospital." In exchange for Slusher and
Ospital agreeing to refrain from enforcing the judgment, the
Campbells promised to bring a bad faith action against State
Farm and to give Slusher and Ospital 90% of any award.'2
The Utah Supreme Court affirmed this jury verdict and, despite
its earlier refusal, State Farm paid the entire judgment. 3 In ac-
cordance with the agreement, the Campbells, now represented by
Slusher and Ospital's attorneys, quickly filed a complaint against
State Farm alleging bad faith failure to settle, fraud, and inten-
tional inflection of emotional distress. 4  State Farm moved for
summary judgment, arguing that because it had paid the excess
verdict, the Campbell's claim of bad faith was precluded as were
the rest of the claims that stemmed from the same bad faith alle-
gation." The trial court granted the motion, but it was reversed
7. Id.
8. Id. at 1142.
9. Campbell, 123 S. Ct. at 1518. State Farm had told the Campbells that "their assets
were safe, that they had no liability for the accident, that [State Farm] would represent
their interests, and that they did not need to procure separate counsel." Id.
10. Id. State Farm's counsel made this abundantly clear to the Campbells when he told
them after the verdict that they "may want to put for sale signs on your property to get
things moving." Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. The Campbells also agreed that they would be represented by Slusher and
Ospital's attorneys in their action against State Farm. Id.
13. Id.
14. Campbell, 123 S. Ct. at 1518. The claim for intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress was based on the Campbells' belief that they were facing financial ruin during the 18
months that State Farm refused to pay the excess verdict. State Farm, 65 P.3d at 1166.
15. Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 840 P.2d 130, 136 (Utah App. 1992).
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on appeal. 6 Upon remand, State Farm next moved to exclude evi-
dence offered by the Campbells concerning unrelated, out of state
cases where the insurance company was alleged to have engaged
in bad faith efforts to avoid paying claims, but the trial court de-
nied this motion. 7 Finally, State Farm requested a bifurcated
trial in front of two different juries. 8 The first jury found that
State Farm's unwillingness to settle and decision to pursue a trial
was unreasonable. 9 The second phase was to address State
Farm's liability for the fraud and emotional distress found in the
first phase, and to determine compensatory and punitive dam-
ages.
2°
When the United States Supreme Court released its decision in
BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore," State Farm reasserted their
motion to exclude out of state conduct that was dissimilar to the
events in Utah, but the trial court once again denied this motion.22
The Campbells were able to introduce evidence of a policy called
"Performance, Planning & Review" (hereinafter "PP&R Policy")
that they claimed was a nationwide scheme by State Farm agents
to cap payments on legitimate claims, like the Campbells, in order
to meet corporate fiscal goals.23 Evidence of the existence and im-
plementation of this policy implicated State Farm's business prac-
tices in several states over a period of 20 years, but most of the
practices entered into evidence did not deal with third-party car
insurance claims like the one at issue in the Campbells' case.24 At
the end of the second phase of the trial, the jury awarded the
Campbells compensatory damages that totaled $2.6 million, and
levied $145 million in punitive damages against State Farm. 5
16. Campbell v. State Farm, 840 P.2d at 143. The Court of Appeals of Utah held that
the Campbell's cause of action arose from State Farm's failure to settle, not its failure to
pay, and therefore the eventual payment of the excess verdict by State Farm did not bar
the Campbells' suit. Id.




21. 517 U.S. 559 (1996). The Supreme Court decided BMW of North America, Inc. v.
Gore, which set the framework for the instant case, before the second phase of the trial
began. Campbell, 123 S. Ct. at 1518.
22. Campbell, 123 S. Ct. at 1518.
23. Id. at 1518-19.
24. Id. at 1519.
25. Id. Compensatory damages are defined as "[d]amages sufficient in amount to in-
demnify the injured person for the loss suffered." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 394 (7th ed.
2000). Punitive damages are defined as "[d]amages awarded in addition to actual damages
Summer 2004 889
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The trial court denied several of State Farm's post-verdict mo-
tions, but it did order a remittur that reduced the compensatory
damages award to $1 million and the punitive damages award to
$25 million.26 Both State Farm and the Campbells appealed this
decision.27
Using both the Supreme Court's decision in Gore as well as
Utah case law, the Utah Supreme Court affirmed the $1 million
remittur in compensatory damages, but reversed and reinstated
the jury verdict for $145 million in punitive damages. 28 The court
found that State Farm's conduct was reprehensible based primar-
ily on the PP&R Policy, and that State Farm's massive wealth and
the large number of people effected by State Farm's action war-
ranted the ratio between compensatory and punitive damages in
this case.2 ' The Supreme Court of the United States granted cer-
tiorari to determine whether the punitive damages award was
excessive in violation of the Due Process Clause."
Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, concluded that the
Utah Supreme Court had misapplied the three "guideposts" illus-
trated in Gore, and that the punitive damage award of $145 mil-
lion compared with a compensatory damage award of $1 million
was "neither reasonable nor proportionate to the wrongs" commit-
ted by State Farm.31 Therefore, the punitive damages portion of
the jury verdict violated the Due Process Clause because the
award was an "irrational and arbitrary deprivation" of State
Farm's property.32
Justice Kennedy began his analysis by discussing the purposes
that compensatory and punitive damages serve in the judicial sys-
when the defendant acted with recklessness, malice, or deceit." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
396 (7th ed. 2000).
26. Campbell, 123 S. Ct. at 1519.
27. Id.
28. State Farm, 65 P.3d at 1143. Utah state law requires that a trial judge review a
jury award by looking at the following seven factors: the wealth of the defendant, the na-
ture of the misconduct, the facts and circumstances surrounding the conduct, the effect of
the conduct on the lives of the plaintiffs and others, the probability of future misconduct,
the relationship between the parties, and the amount of compensatory damages. Id. at
1146 (quoting Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789 (Utah 1991) and Crookston v. Fire
Ins. Exch., 860 P.2d 937 (Utah 1993)).
29. State Farm, 65 P.3d at 1146-47.
30. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 535 U.S. 1111 (2002). The Due Proc-
ess Clause provides that "[n]o State shall.., deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
31. Campbell, 123 S. Ct. at 1526. The majority included Chief Justice Rehnquist along
with Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, and Breyer. Id. at 1517.
32. Id.
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tern.33 He stated that while compensatory damages make the vic-
tim whole again, punitive damages are aimed at deterring mis-
conduct and providing retribution for the victim.34 Justice Ken-
nedy also remarked that states are given wide latitude in deter-
mining punitive damages, but the party receiving the punishment
is protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment from any awards that are excessive or capricious. 35  The
Court noted the similarity between civil punitive damages and
criminal penalties, yet expressed concerns that the defendant in a
civil proceeding is not afforded the same protections that a defen-
dant in a criminal matter is entitled, making the imprecise man-
ner in which punitive damages are awarded all the more worri-
some. 6 With these issues in mind, the Supreme Court had set up
"guideposts" in order to ensure that an award of punitive damages
comported with Due Process. 7
The three "guideposts" formulated by the Supreme Court in
Gore for use by lower courts in determining the reasonableness of
punitive damage awards are: "(1) the degree of reprehensibility of
the defendant's misconduct; (2) the disparity between the actual or
potential harm suffered by the plaintiff and the punitive damages
award; and (3) the differences between the punitive damages
awarded by the jury and the civil penalties authorized or imposed
in comparable cases."8 The standard of review to be used by ap-
pellate courts when reviewing the trial court's application of these
guideposts is de novo. 9
Justice Kennedy addressed each of the guideposts in turn, be-
ginning with the most important consideration, the degree of rep-
rehensibility of the defendant's misconduct.' The Court first rec-
ognized that State Farm's conduct with respect to the Campbells
was indeed reprehensible and an award for punitive damages was
33. Id. at 1519.
34. Id.
35. Id. 1519-20.
36. Campbell, 123 S. Ct. at 1520.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. Justice Kennedy commented that, "[u]nder the principles outlined in BMW of
North America, Inc. v. Gore, this case is neither close nor difficult." Id. at 1521. Under a de
novo standard of review, if the trial court finds that the award is not excessive, then the
appellate court defers to the trial court's finding of fact unless it is clearly erroneous and
conducts an independent review of the trial court's application of the Gore test to the facts
of the case. Cooper Indus. v. Leatherman Tool Group, 532 U.S. 424, 435 (2001).
40. Campbell, 123 S. Ct. at 1520.
Summer 2004 891
Duquesne Law Review
appropriate. 4' However, the majority noted that there were fun-
damental mistakes in the lower courts' formulation of reprehensi-
bility.42 The Court noted the first error was to admit evidence of
conduct that took place outside of Utah when formulating the pun-
ishment against State Farm.43 Justice Kennedy explained that the
case presented to the jury ceased to be about the harm suffered by
the Campbells, but rather became a condemnation of State Farm's
nationwide policies and practices. 44 The second error the Court
described was that conduct completely unrelated to the case with
the Campbells served as the basis for State Farm's punishment.45
With these considerations in mind, Justice Kennedy concluded
that the only conduct relevant to assessing reprehensibility was
State Farm's conduct that directly harmed the Campbells.46
Justice Kennedy next turned his attention to the second "guide-
post," the ratio between the compensatory damages and punitive
damages. 47 The majority eschewed a rigid bright-line rule that
would set the ratio in all cases, but cautioned that punitive dam-
ages awards that were greater than ten times the compensatory
damages would most likely violate due process.48 Justice Kennedy
stated that it was the job of the courts to make sure that the puni-
tive damages awarded were both reasonable and proportional to
the harm that the defendant caused the plaintiff.4 The Court
prefaced its analysis of the award in the instant case by noting
that a ratio of 145 to 1 was presumptively neither reasonable nor
proportional.5" Justice Kennedy examined the Utah Supreme
Court's explanation for upholding the disparate award, and con-
cluded that there was nothing to justify such an excessive punitive
damages award.5"
The third "guidepost" analyzed by Justice Kennedy functions to
compare and contrast the punitive damages award with the civil
penalties imposed in similar cases. 2 The Court noted that if
41. Id. at 1521.
42. Id.
43. Id. Additionally, much of the out-of-state conduct was admittedly lawful in the
states where it occurred. Id. at 1522.
44. Id. at 1521.
45. Campbell, 123 S. Ct. at 1523.




50. Campbell, 123 S. Ct. at 1524.
51. Id. at 1525.
52. Id. at 1526.
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criminal charges could be applicable to a certain case, this might
be useful to show how a state regards the misconduct, but it is not
helpful in determining an appropriate dollar amount for a puni-
tive award.53 Justice Kennedy faulted the Utah Supreme Court
again for relying on out-of-state and dissimilar conduct to conclude
that State Farm's activities could expose it to a variety of civil
penalties.' The Court commented that Utah state law imposed a
$10,000 fine for the type of fraudulent conduct that State Farm
committed against the Campbells.55 The Court concluded that the
Utah Supreme Court's analysis was, as in the other guideposts,
deficient, and there was nothing to justify the amount of the
award.56 Therefore, the majority remanded the case to the Utah
Supreme Court with instructions to calculate correctly the puni-
tive damages using the opinion as guidance."
Justice Scalia wrote a short dissenting opinion in which he ex-
pressed his view that evaluations of punitive damages awards are
outside the scope of due process protections.58 Justice Thomas au-
thored a similar dissent in which he stated that it was his belief
that the Constitution placed no limits on punitive damages
awards.5"
Justice Ginsburg also filed a dissenting opinion in which she ar-
gued that the Court had made an unwarranted intrusion into the
authority of the states to determine the size of punitive damages
awards. ° She first noted that awards of this size might call for
state legislatures to consider passing damage-capping statutes.61
Unlike the majority, Justice Ginsburg found ample evidence of
reprehensible conduct by State Farm.62 She also disagreed with
the majority and found that there was clearly a relationship be-
tween State Farm's out-of state conduct and the fraudulent treat-
ment to which the Campbells were subjected.63 In her opinion, the
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Campbell, 123 S. Ct. at 1526.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
59. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
60. Campbell, 123 S. Ct. at 1527 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
61. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
62. Id. at 1527-30 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). For instance, there was evidence that a
State Farm manager had instructed a subordinate to include a note in the file that Ospital
was speeding to see a pregnant girlfriend, which was a lie, in order to attack Ospital's
character in the event of a trial. Id. at 1528.
63. Id. at 1530 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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majority exceeded its authority by formulating rigid instructions
that all states must now follow.'
Although the concept of imposing punitive damages began in
England in the 1760s, during the reign of King George III, and
was later adopted by the United States, the Supreme Court has
only recently begun to examine the constitutionality of this type of
award because punitive damages were long thought to be a part of
traditional state tort law.65 In the 1980s, there appeared to be a
surge in the number of punitive damages awards as well as an
increase in their size and, as a result, the Supreme Court began to
weigh in on the issue.66 The Court expressed concern that punitive
damages awards had "run wild" to the point where they impacted
on a defendant's constitutional rights and needed to be re-
strained.67
The Supreme Court's current jurisprudence on the issue of pu-
nitive damages began in Browning-Ferris Industries v. Kelco Dis-
posal.68 In Browning-Ferris, the Court addressed the issue of
whether the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment
applied to punitive damages awards in civil cases, and in particu-
lar, whether a $6 million award of punitive damages was an ex-
cessive fine when compensatory damages were assessed at
$51,146.69 Browning-Ferris Industries (hereinafter "BFI") was a
waste disposal company that tried to put a local competitor out of
business by using illegal pricing strategies.7" Kelco, the local busi-
ness, sued BFI for attempting to monopolize the Burlington, Ver-
mont waste disposal business, as well as for intentional interfer-
ence with contractual relations.71 The jury found that BFI was
liable on both counts and awarded the above-mentioned $51,146
64. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
65. VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ ET AL., PROSSER, WADE AND ScHwARTZ's TORTS 549-50 (10th
ed. 2000). Punitive damages were first awarded in "cases of outrageous abuses of authority
by government officers." Id. at 549. The determination of whether an award was warranted
and the appropriate amount was long left to the discretion of the individual states. Id. at
550 (quoting Molzofv. United States, 502 U.S. 301, 306 (1992)).
66. See Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages, 56
S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1982). Justice Blackmun has illustrated the Court's increasing concern
about the constitutionality of certain punitive damages awards. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co.
v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 9-13 (1991).
67. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 18.
68. 492 U.S. 257 (1989).
69. Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 259. "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor exces-
sive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend.
VIII.
70. Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 260-61.
71. Id. at 261.
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compensatory damages and the $6 million punitive damages."
BFI appealed, and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed
both the verdict and the award, noting that even if the Eighth
Amendment applied, the award was not excessive. 3 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari to determine whether the Eighth
Amendment applied.74
The members of the Court all agreed that the Eighth Amend-
ment could not be applied when determining whether punitive
damages were excessive in civil cases." Justice Blackmun, writing
for the majority, described the history of the Eighth Amendment
and its exclusive relation to criminal cases. 6 He traced the history
of the amendment back to Section 10 of the English Bill of Rights
of 1689, and stated that based on its history, the Excessive Fines
Clause was "intended to limit only those fines directly imposed by,
and payable to, the government."77
BFI made an argument in their brief that the Due Process
Clause forbade excessive punitive damages awards.78 The Court
recognized that there was some merit to this contention, but re-
fused to address the issue because it was not properly raised in
the district court or the court of appeals and therefore was
waived.79 Several Justices commented, however, that the opinion
in the instant case in no way barred the Court from considering
the question if it was properly presented in the future."0
The chance to address the due process question arrived in the
form of Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Company v. Haslip." In
Haslip, a licensed agent of Pacific Mutual defrauded several poli-
cyholders by misappropriating their premium payments and not
informing them when their policies expired." Haslip was hospital-
ized and thought that she had health insurance, but when it was
discovered the coverage had lapsed, her bill was given to a collec-
tion agency.83 In her action against Pacific Mutual, Haslip was
72. Id. at 262.
73. Id.
74. 488 U.S. 980 (1988).
75. Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 260.
76. Id. at 262.
77. Id. at 266-68.
78. Brief for the Petitioners at 27; Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. 257 (1989).
79. Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 277.
80. Id. at 280 (Brennan, J., concurring). See also id. at 283 (O'Connor, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
81. 499 U.S. 1 (1991).
82. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 4-5.
83. Id. at 5.
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awarded $200,000 in compensatory damages and $840,000 in pu-
nitive damages." The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the ver-
dict and the award, but two justices dissented recognizing Due
Process concerns. 5
In the United States Supreme Court, Justice Blackmun began
his analysis by first noting that the issue of due process concerns
over punitive damages had often appeared before the Court, but
for a variety of reasons had never been fully addressed. 6 The first
due process concern that the Court addressed was whether it was
fair to hold Pacific Mutual responsible for the actions of its li-
censed agent.87 Justice Blackmun described that the agent was an
employee of Pacific Mutual, and under Alabama common law, the
corporation was liable for the actions of its employee under a the-
ory of respondeat superior.88 The Court stated that holding the
corporation responsible for punitive damages that result from the
employee's actions does not violate due process. 8 The Court next
examined whether the methods used by Alabama juries to deter-
mine punitive damages violated due process. 0 Justice Blackmun
concluded that the procedure followed by Alabama juries has long
been held to be fair, but there was still a possibility that an impo-
sition of punitive damages could be unconstitutional in certain
circumstances.9' With this in mind, the Court examined the con-
stitutionality of the punitive damages award to Haslip.9"
In analyzing this issue, the Court first looked at the instructions
given to the jury and noted that it was made clear to the jury that
the purpose of a punitive award was to punish Pacific Mutual and
to deter the corporation from acting this way in the future.93 Jus-
tice Blackmun commented that although these instructions gave
84. Id. at 7 n.2.
85. Id. at 7.
86. Id. at 12.
87. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 12.
88. Id. at 12-15. Respondeat superior is "[tihe doctrine holding an employer or princi-
pal liable for the employee's or agents' wrongful acts committed within the scope of em-
ployment or agency." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1313 (7th ed. 2000).
89. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 15.
90. Id. Justice Blackmun explained that:
Under the traditional common-law approach, the amount of the punitive award is
initially determined by a jury instructed to consider the gravity of the wrong and the
need to deter similar wrongful conduct. The jury's determination is then reviewed by
trial and appellate courts to ensure that it is reasonable.
Id.
91. Id. at 17-18.
92. Id. at 18.
93. Id. at 19.
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the jury broad discretion, they were constrained by the fact that
the award must meet the twin goals of retribution and deter-
94rence.
The Court examined the post-trial procedure that Alabama had
developed to evaluate the fairness of punitive awards, and stated
that the post-verdict review protects defendants from dispropor-
tionate awards and ensures that there is some relationship be-
tween the award and the actual damages.95 The majority con-
cluded that Due Process was satisfied by the determination of a
punitive award in Haslip, but noted that the four to one ratio be-
tween punitive and compensatory awards may be "close to the
line" of constitutional impropriety.96
In TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., the Court
had another opportunity to determine whether a punitive dam-
ages award was grossly excessive and in violation of due process."
The dispute in TXO concerned dealings between TXO and Alliance
in which TXO agreed to develop the oil and gas resources on a
tract of land owned by Alliance.98 TXO learned that another party
had an interest in the mineral rights of the property, but this in-
terest did not extend to the oil and gas that was the subject of the
deal and this claim to the mineral rights would not cloud the title
possessed by Alliance.99 Nevertheless, TXO purchased the other
party's mineral interest without informing Alliance and attempted
to renegotiate the development agreement by arguing that it now
had title to the oil and gas rights by virtue of the quitclaim deed.' 0
When TXO could not renegotiate the deal, it brought suit against
Alliance seeking a declaratory judgment on the question of oil and
gas rights and Alliance counterclaimed for a slander of title alleg-
ing that TXO acted in bad faith because it knew Alliance pos-
sessed a clear title.'0 ' The jury found for Alliance and awarded
$19,000 in actual damages and $10 million in punitive damages.'
0 2
TXO sought a judgment notwithstanding the verdict and a remit-
94. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 19. Justice Blackmun stated, "[a]s long as the discretion is
exercised with reasonable constraints, due process is satisfied." Id. at 20.
95. Id. at 20-22.
96. Id. at 23-24.
97. 509 U.S. 443 (1993).
98. TXO, 509 U.S. at 447.
99. Id. at 448.
100. Id. at 449.
101. Id. at 450.
102. Id. at 451.
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tur of the award, both of which were denied by the trial court.0
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals used a reasonable
relationship test that focused on factors illustrated in Haslip and
affirmed the jury verdict.
1 4
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and although a majority
of the Court affirmed the punitive award, there was no clear ma-
jority on the rationale.'0 ' Justice Stevens authored the main opin-
ion in which the award was analyzed under both substantive and
procedural due process protections.0 6 Justice Stevens rejected
both of the tests for substantive due process that were proposed by
TXO and Alliance and instead embraced an analysis that focused
on the reasonableness of the award.' 7 TXO had placed great em-
phasis on the disparity between the actual and the punitive dam-
ages in this case, but Justice Stevens noted that there existed a
reasonable relationship between the punitive award and the harm
that could have resulted had TXO succeeded in its scheme. 08 He
concluded that TXO's substantive due process right against exces-
sive punitive damages awards was not violated. 0 9
Justice Stevens next analyzed TXO's argument that they were
denied procedural due process because the jury instructions were
inadequate and the West Virginia trial and appellate courts erred
in their analysis."0 After reviewing the jury instructions and the
method of review used by the trial and appeals courts, Justice
Stevens concluded that the procedure followed in the West Vir-
ginia courts was fundamentally fair.'
Justice Kennedy agreed with Justice Stevens' analysis as to the
procedural due process question, but wrote separately to express
concerns over the plurality's use of the reasonableness of the rela-
tionship between the award and the harm as the focus when de-
103. TXO, 509 U.S. at 451.
104. Id. at 452-53. The three factors were the potential harm, the maliciousness of
TXO's conduct, and the punishment necessary to discourage the company from acting in
this manner in the future. Id. at 453.
105. Id. at 445.
106. Id. at 446.
107. Id. at 458. Alliance proposed that a rational-basis test should be used for appellate
review of punitive damages awards. Id. at 455. TXO proposed that the Court use a height-
ened scrutiny test that would look at objective criteria such as the size of awards upheld
against other tortfeasors in the same state to determine if an award was fundamentally
fair. Id. at 455-56.
108. TXO, 509 U.S. at 459-60.
109. Id. at 462.
110. Id. at 462-63.
111. Id. at 464-66.
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termining whether an award is excessive." 2 He argued that the
size of the award was not the proper focus of a substantive due
process challenge, but rather that the inquiry should concern
whether the jury acted reasonably when it came to its decision."3
Justice Kennedy concluded that although this was a close case, it
did not appear that the jury made an irrational or arbitrary deci-
sion when it awarded punitive damages, and he therefore voted to
affirm the jury award."1
4
Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment, but wrote to make it
clear that while he supported the position that there were proce-
dural protections afforded by the Constitution, there was no such
guarantee of a substantive due process right that would protect
defendants from excessive awards."'
Justice O'Connor authored a dissenting opinion in which she
used the principles expressed in Haslip to conclude that the award
in this case was a violation of due process because the size of the
award was too large and the procedure by which the jury reached
its decision was flawed."'
The Supreme Court overturned a punitive damages award in
BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, and in doing so, laid out the
three "guideposts" to be used when a court reviews a punitive
damages award based on due process grounds."' The issue in this
case was whether a jury award of $2 million in punitive damages
was excessive when actual damages were determined to be
$4,000.118
Justice Stevens commented that the Court reviewed this case in
order to help clarify for lower courts the standards that should be
112. Id. at 466 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
113. TXO, 509 U.S. at 467 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judg-
ment). He wrote, "[wihen a punitive damages award reflects bias, passion, or prejudice on
the part of the jury, rather than a rational concern for deterrence and retribution, the Con-
stitution has been violated, no matter what the absolute or relative size of the award." Id.
114. Id. at 468-70 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
115. Id. at 470 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Scalia was joined by
Justice Thomas. Id.
116. Id. at 473 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor was joined by Justice White,
and by Justice Souter in part. Id. at 472.
117. 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
118. Gore, 517 U.S. at 562-63. Dr. Ira Gore bought a new BMW in Alabama, but several
months later detected that it had been repainted. Id. at 563. The original paint job had
been damaged by acid rain during shipping from Germany and, according to BMW's policy,
the car had been repainted without the dealer's knowledge since the cost of repairing the
damage was less than 3% of the car's retail price. Id. Gore sued alleging fraud in the con-
cealment of this fact. Id.
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used to identify excessive awards. 9 After reviewing the legiti-
mate interests that a state has in using punitive damages, the
Court commented that Alabama was exceeding its bounds by pun-
ishing BMW for conduct that was legal in other states.2 ° Justice
Stevens wrote, "[e]lementary notions of fairness enshrined in our
constitutional jurisprudence dictate that a person receive fair no-
tice not only of the conduct that will subject him to punishment,
but also of the severity of the penalty that a State may impose." 2'
With these considerations in mind, the majority described the
three "guideposts" that are to be used to determine whether an
award is grossly excessive, and concluded that BMW did not have
fair notice that they would be punished so severely for not report-
ing that a car sold as new had been repainted.'22
The degree of reprehensibility of BMW's conduct was the first
"guidepost" analyzed by the Court.'23 In illustrating what consti-
tutes reprehensible behavior, the majority mentioned several gen-
eralizations, such as the notion that violent conduct is more
blameworthy than nonviolent conduct, and that fraud is more
blameworthy than negligence, and comparisons such as these are
useful when judging the enormity of the defendant's offense. 24
Justice Stevens found very little that could be labeled "reprehen-
sible" in BMW's conduct, pointing out that the only harm to Gore
was economic, and it was miniscule at that.' Additionally, Gore
had argued that BMW's nondisclosure of its repair policy was rep-
rehensible because it was national in scope and therefore the com-
pany should be treated as a recidivist and be punished more se-
verely, but Justice Stevens rejected this argument by showing
that the conduct was legal in many states and that liability for
fraud requires an omission of a material fact, of which repairs for
minor damage arguably is not. 26 The Court concluded that
BMW's nondisclosure of minor damage repairs to cars sold as new
was not nearly reprehensible enough to justify a $2 million pun-
ishment.
27
119. Id. at 568.
120. Id. at 568-74.
121. Id. at 574.
122. Id. at 574-75.
123. Gore, 517 U.S. at 575.
124. Id. at 575-76.
125. Id. at 576.
126. Id. at 576-79.
127. Id. at 580.
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Justice Stevens moved to the second guidepost that had devel-
oped in the Supreme Court's jurisprudence, the ratio between the
harm suffered and the punitive damages awarded.' The Court
reiterated its refusal to develop a mathematical formula for de-
termining the correct ratio in all cases, and further endorsed the
reasonable relationship approach developed in Haslip and TXO. 9
Justice Stevens called the 500 to 1 ratio in this case "breathtak-
ing," and concluded that this ratio did not appear to be reason-
able.
130
Relying on Browning-Ferris and Haslip, the Court illustrated
the third guidepost, a comparison of the punitive award and the
civil or criminal penalties that a state could impose.' The Court
recognized that the treatment by the legislature of certain conduct
is an indication that should be afforded substantial deference.32
Justice Stevens noted that Alabama's statute for deceptive trade
practices set a penalty of $2,000, and that other states had similar
provisions. 133 He also stated that BMW could not have contem-
plated that it could be facing a multimillion dollar judgment as a
result of its policy because there were no decisions in Alabama
indicating that conduct such as BMW's would give rise to such
harsh punishment. The Court concluded that the comparison
between the award and applicable civil or criminal penalties pro-
vided no justification for the award in this case.135
Although the decision in Gore was meant to clarify the Supreme
Court's position on the proper analysis of punitive awards, there
was still confusion in the lower courts about the proper standard
of review that should be used in conducting this analysis, and this
issue was addressed in Cooper Industries v. Leatherman Tool
Group.13' Leatherman was awarded compensatory damages of
$50,000 and punitive damages of $4.5 million for a false advertis-
128. Gore, 517 U.S. at 580.
129. Id. at 580-83.
130. Id. at 583.
131. Id.
132. Id. (quoting Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco, 492 U.S. 257, 301 (1989) (O'Connor,
J., with whom Stevens, J., joined, concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
133. Gore, 517 U.S. at 584.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 584-85.
136. 532 U.S. 424 (2001). This case concerned claims of trade-dress infringement, unfair
competition, and false advertising by Leatherman against Cooper. Id. at 428. Cooper had
used a slightly modified version of Leatherman's popular multipurpose tool at trade shows
to sell their own version of the tool. Id. at 427-28.
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ing claim against Cooper.'37 The trial judge reviewed the award
and held that it did not violate due process, and the Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that there was no
abuse of discretion in the decision by the trial judge.' The issue
on appeal was whether an abuse of discretion was the appropriate
standard when the Gore guideposts are used to determine the con-
stitutionality of an award for punitive damages. 9 Justice Ste-
vens, writing for the majority, held that the review of the jury's
award should be conducted de novo. 4 ° He reasoned that the
proper constitutional analysis could only be performed by a court
using an independent review of the facts of a specific case.'4 ' Jus-
tice Stevens also showed that reviewing the facts in this particular
case under both an abuse of discretion and de novo standards
could lead to dissimilar results.4 The Court remanded the case to
the court of appeals with instructions to conduct a de novo re-
view.
143
There can be little debate that punitive damages awards were
becoming extremely large by the time the U.S. Supreme Court
decided to weigh in on the matter. It certainly appeared as if ju-
ries were in some way biased against large, faceless corporations
with deep pockets. Eye-popping awards, such as the $145 million
given to the Campbells, do inspire a gut reaction in most reason-
able people that something must be amiss in the jury room. Spe-
cific retribution for the victim turned into general vindictiveness
toward the corporation, with little thought to the consequences
that the award will mean to the company. The average jury does
not seem to realize that the cost of the award will be passed on to
them as consumers, or that jobs might be lost in order to cut costs
to pay for the award. It was apparent that something needed to
be done to address a process that seemed to be out of control, or in
the Court's words, "run wild."
One of the main questions surrounding this action is whether
the state legislature, rather than the Supreme Court, is the proper
forum for such a sweeping change. In an appendix to her dissent-
ing opinion in Gore, Justice Ginsburg collected the state statutes
137. Cooper Industries, 532 U.S. at 426.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 431.
141. Id. at 435-36.
142. Cooper Industries, 532 U.S. at 441.
143. Id. at 443.
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that deal with issues such as caps on punitive awards, require-
ments that all or part of the award be paid to state agencies, and
procedural rules that mandate a bifurcated trial with a separate
proceeding during which the punitive award is determined.'
From this list, it is obvious that many state legislatures have
taken it upon themselves to enact safeguards that will limit the
amount awarded, as well as make an application of the Gore
guideposts unnecessary. It will be interesting to see if the analy-
sis employed by the Court in Campbell changes when an action
arises in a state where punitive awards are capped, such as in
Virginia.'45 Along the same lines, a question remains whether the
Gore guidepost analysis will be applied to punitive awards in class
action lawsuits where there are multiple plaintiffs. The analysis
should not be any different, but there are a number of additional
factors that come into play when a jury has to evaluate the con-
duct of one defendant and the harm inflicted, in varying degrees,
to many individuals.
Another concern that was not addressed by the Court in its re-
cent jurisprudence is how this formulation of punitive damages
will affect efforts to negotiate settlements. Not only are punitive
damages a way to punish a wrongdoer, but the looming threat of
an award plays a role in determining whether to settle and on
what terms. The uncertainty posed by the possibility of a large
punitive award, the size of which is up to the total discretion of
the jury and is unquantifiable by both parties, could compel a set-
tlement. If a party can now use these guideposts to predict a fig-
ure that the court is more than likely to enforce, the motivation to
settle might be diminished as one of the risks of going to trial is
mitigated. The degree of chance once associated with punitive
awards has been extinguished now that courts have been in-
structed on the proper procedure for formulating and reviewing
awards.
Following the decision in Campbell and with the start of a new
Supreme Court term in October 2003, the Court received numer-
ous requests to review jury awards. For instance, Philip Morris
appealed an $80 million award given to a deceased smoker's fam-
ily claiming it was excessive. The Court agreed, vacated the
judgment, and remanded the case back to the Oregon court with
144. Gore, 517 U.S. at 614-19.
145. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-38.1 (1992). Virginia has capped awards at $350,000. Id.
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instructions to review the award in light of Campbell.46 In No-
vember of 2003, in a dispute over oil royalties between the state of
Alabama and Exxon Mobil, a jury returned a verdict for $63.6 mil-
lion in actual damages and $11.9 billion in punitive damages.47 It
is apparent that this award will not survive a Campbell analysis.
It is clear that the Court is responding favorably to the appeals
by companies for relief from large jury awards. At the same time,
neither the state's interest in the matter nor the harm suffered by
the plaintiff can be ignored. It is worth noting that the state pro-
cedures by which juries determine the intitial punitive damages
award remain intact. Nothing in the Supreme Court's recent ju-
risprudence indicates that the instructions given to juries violate
procedural due process, and state's remain free to develop and
maintain their own instructions. In spite of criticisms that the
Supreme Court has overstepped its bounds and is intruding on an
area of law traditionally dealt with by the states, the framework
developed in Gore has been proven by Campbell to be a practical
and workable solution to the problem of excessive punitive dam-
ages awards.
Robert Max Junker
146. Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 124 S. Ct. 56 (2003).
147. William Branigin, Exxon Mobil Told to Pay $11.9 Billion: Jury Finds Fraud in
Alabama Gas Deal, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A42800-
2003Novl4.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2003).
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